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Abstract  
 
Elite universities in the United States aim to admit the most qualified and 
competent students (meritocratic recruitment), but also prioritize admitting 
children of alumni via legacy programs (nepotistic recruitment). These two 
approaches to admissions are often at odds because the children of alumni might 
not be the most qualified applicants. What happens when people are forced to 
support an applicant who is meritocratic, nepotistic, both meritocratic and 
nepotistic, or neither? To examine this question, I had participants assume the 
role of an admissions counselor in an admissions committee tasked with picking 
one top student to admit. I predicted that without pressure to agree on supporting 
an applicant, participants would support the meritocratic applicant over the 
nepotistic applicants and perceive the meritocratic applicant to be more qualified 
than the nepotistic applicant. However, if there is pressure to agree to support a 
particular applicant, participants would publicly support the favored applicant but 
privately resent doing so. Results provided mixed support: Although pressure did 
not directly influence public and private endorsement, there was an indirect of 
pressure on endorsement measures via reactance. Pressure elicited the same 
psychological mechanisms (reactance and informational contamination) that help 
explain why people tend to favor meritocratic applicants but disfavor nepotistic 
applicants. I close with discussing implications of these two recruitment methods.  
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A lot of people think big business in America is a bad thing. I think it's a 
really good thing. Most people in business are ethical, hard-working, good 
people. And it's a meritocracy. 
-Steve Jobs 
The world is not a meritocracy, as much as we may like to pretend that it 
is. And we have a really long way to go before we really reward people based on 
their own merit. 
-Malcolm Gladwell 
Pressure to Support Meritocracy vs. Nepotism 
When businesses recruit new employees, when schools recruit new 
students, and when sports team recruit new players, recruitment practices often 
focus on hiring individuals who are most competent (Petersen, Saporta, & 
Seidel, 2000). Recruiting the most qualified and competent people is known as 
meritocracy. Meritocratic recruitment aims recruit to the most talented group of 
people from a given population to maximize competency and productivity. For 
instance, Olympic teams recruit the best athletes in each country. Top 
technology companies such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon actively recruit 
the most qualified applicants, which in turn maximizes the productivity of those 
companies (Tobak, 2017).  
Nonetheless, as the opening quotations denote, some people believe that 
the world is meritocracy, while others do not. Given recent events that sparked 
moral outrage such as the 2019 college admissions bribery scandal (Kates, 
2019), which involved cheating in standardized tests (Hartocollis & Engelmayer, 
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2019) and faking extra-curricular credentials (Levitz & Korn, 2019), it is important 
to understand how people perceive meritocracy and nepotism as recruitment 
methods in elite U.S. universities. In this project, I will examine how participants 
perceive a university applicant’s competency when an authority figure forces the 
participant to support the applicant. In doing so, I will examine how the 
psychology of forced consensus influences how people perceive the competency 
of meritocratic and non-meritocratic applicants.  
Below, I first discuss the merits and drawbacks of meritocracy and 
nepotism, the possible conflict between meritocracy and nepotism, predicted 
outcomes of what will likely happen if one is forced to support a meritocratic or 
nepotistic applicant, followed by two psychological mechanisms of forced 
consensus. In particular, I discuss how a forced consensus may work to instill 
public agreement, but how reactance and informational contamination may 
undermine its effectiveness for private agreement. 
Meritocracy and Nepotism 
Since meritocratic organizations bring together the most capable 
individuals and finding the best person can be highly rewarding for both the 
organization and the individual, competition to join meritocratic organizations is 
sure to follow (Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, & Pohl, 2011). Individuals who 
know they are not the most qualified for the position may compensate by 
increasing their competency. But they may also use methods that in one way or 
another circumvents meritocracy. They may use blatant disingenuous methods, 
such as trying to appear more competent than they are (e.g. exaggerating their 
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resume). Alternatively, persons may use personal connections of some kind to 
land a job or gain admissions to a university, even if their skills would suggest 
they are not qualified.  
One form this reliance on personal connections takes is nepotism. 
Nepotism is the practice of favoring those in one’s in-group (e.g. family members) 
above other factors (Firfiray, Cruz, Neacsu, & Gomez-Mejia, 2018). Nepotism 
occurs in universities (e.g., legacy programs), in the workplace (e.g., family 
businesses), in Hollywood, and also in politics (Robertson-Snape, 1999; Fanning, 
Howard, & O’Boyle, 2010).  
In the current research, we examine the conflict between meritocracy vs. 
nepotism in the context of admissions to elite universities in the United 
States. While elite universities aspire to recruit the best and brightest students, 
they also consistently recruit children of alumni (i.e., legacy programs) who may 
not be the most qualified applicants (Nisen, 2013). Although supporters of 
meritocratic recruitment argue against these legacy programs because being 
related to alumni provides applicants an unfair advantage, those who support 
nepotistic recruitment argue that legacy programs instill continuity as alumni will 
actively stay involved with the university, provide networking opportunities, and 
that children of alumni are often highly successful.  
As this paper explores key factors that make people more or less likely to 
endorse meritocratic or nepotistic applicants, I will first discuss common reasons 
why each system is endorsed, as well as pertinent issues with each system. 
The Benefits and Drawbacks of Meritocracy  
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In theory, meritocracy maximizes competency and garners the most talent 
and quality. The top business firms, law firms, and technology firms hire the most 
competent employees to keep themselves ahead of their competition. Elite 
universities aim to recruit the most competent students so their graduating 
classes would perform well in the “real world”.   
Generally speaking, meritocracy is the default method in hiring/admission 
practices because it recruits the best possible applicants and presumably 
provides the organization with the most gain (Littler, 2018). However, meritocracy 
faces a handful of crucial issues that may reduce its effectiveness (Littler, 2018). 
Hiring via meritocracy can 1) be tedious and costly, 2) be highly difficult to 
measure, and 3) assume talent and intelligence are innate (see Heine, 2018, for 
a discussion). 
These issues in meritocracy apply in the context of admissions to elite 
university programs, which often draw in thousands of applications every year. 
Since each application contains many components (i.e. Grade point average, 
standardized test scores, recommendation letters, personal statements, etc.), 
going through every application thoroughly consumes thousands of hours that 
admission committees might not have. As such, admission committees often 
narrow down the application pool via arbitrary cut-off scores of some given 
quantitative values such as percentiles in grade point average and standardized 
test scores (e.g., GRE, MCAT, LSAT, GMAT). This practice indeed narrows 
down the applicant pool, but the cut-off scores often assume that standardized 
tests accurately measure intelligence. However, this is not necessarily the case; 
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even the most robust standardized tests, such as Raven’s Progressive Matrices, 
are entangled in culture and biased against some groups of people (Nisbett, 
2009; Heine, 2018).  
Even if we assume standardized test scores genuinely capture 
intelligence, cut-off scores may overlook vital non-cognitive measures and 
unrealized talent that could predict high performance in university contexts. 
Applicants who have subpar SAT scores may have personality traits that predict 
strong performance in university. High trait conscientiousness, for instance, is 
associated with high GPA scores (Noftle & Robins, 2007). Conscientiousness is 
overlooked in standardized tests but is instead conveyed via other means such 
as recommendation letters or personal statements. Yet, the value of non-
cognitive measures conveyed via recommendation letters and personal 
statements face the issue of a ceiling effect (i.e. recommendation letters almost 
always praise the student) or manipulation (e.g. personal statements can be 
written by a group of people that exaggerates the student’s achievements and 
appropriate fit for the university program).  
Lastly, meritocracy assumes that talent and intelligence are innate which, 
in turn, can create arbitrary social divisions by implying that people who are born 
intelligent are fit for success while those born with subpar intelligence are not 
(Haier, 2017). Indeed, merit-based beliefs open doors for prejudice against the 
less educated (Kuppens et al., 2018), and priming merit-based beliefs can lead 
people to justify inequality due to perceived differences in talent (McCoy & Major, 
2007). But not all talent is necessarily inherited as the heritability of talent and IQ 
MERITOCRACY VS. NEPOTISM 
 
6 
can be highly variable (Heine, 2018). IQ heritability could be lower in wealthier 
populations partly because children who live in rich environments have access 
opportunities for intellectual engagement, whereas children who live in poor 
environments could face more fluctuation as to how much their environments 
provide intellectual development (Nisbett, 2009; Heine, 2018). Nonetheless, 
there are people who believe that intelligence is innate and that genetic 
predispositions can play a role in excluding certain groups from the meritocracy 
pool. 
The Benefits and Drawbacks of Nepotism 
While recruiting via meritocracy aims to maximize competency, recruiting 
via nepotism prioritizes in-group members, particularly family members (Riggio & 
Saggi, 2015). While in Western contexts “nepotism” has a negative valence, 
there are in fact many arguments both for and against nepotism. On one hand, 
opponents of nepotism argue that placing family members ahead of the 
competition is unfair because prioritizing one’s family could potentially exclude 
more competent people who are in the outgroup. Those born in a family with 
meaningful connections may be given more opportunities without considering 
one’s ability. As such, people often believe that when nepotism is involved, the 
beneficiary of nepotism is unqualified (Padgett & Morris, 2005).  
In the context of elite universities, nepotism favors children of alumni, 
professors, or those with authority (e.g. Deans). Research has found that 
nepotism occurs in U.S. universities at substantial rates (Golden, 2003), the 
probability of admitting a legacy student in many selective U.S. universities can 
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be at least three times greater than admitting a non-legacy student (Espenshade, 
Chung, & Walling, 2004; Hurwitz 2011), and that legacy students do, on average, 
have lower GPAs than students admitted via meritocratic means (Massey & 
Mooney, 2007). Because of these findings, students who get admitted via legacy 
programs may be perceived as having unwarranted and undeserved acceptance 
to a top school.  
On the other hand, proponents of nepotism argue that people understand 
in-group members (i.e. family members or close friends) well and having a 
preexisting relationship is highly beneficial when it comes to working together. 
Indeed, some research suggests that merit-based recruitment in sports teams 
can, after a certain point, hinder team performance due to the lack of intrateam 
coordination (Swaab, et al., 2014). This suggests that despite the potential 
drawback of compromising talent, recruiting from within the family (or other 
ingroups) can increase coordination if viewpoints and beliefs are aligned. Trust, 
for instance, is often a competitive advantage within family businesses because 
employers can assume loyalty, and by extension, a lower likelihood of betrayal 
from their fellow family employees (Sundaramurthy, 2008).  
What Influences the Psychology of Meritocratic vs. Nepotistic Applicants? 
Meritocracy and nepotism are often at odds since someone familiar (e.g. 
close friend or family member) is not necessarily the most competent. Recruiting 
via meritocracy and nepotism is an issue that has been debated for years 
(Espenshade & Chung, 2005) and this debate stems from the perceived 
unfairness of nepotism. Specifically, nepotism is thought to be unfair when the 
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person chosen for the position is not qualified or not competent, thereby going 
against the goal of meritocracy. Notably, nepotism can occur without the 
presence of the ingroup connection. Simply knowing that someone is favored 
because of one’s connections is sufficient to elicit perceptions of nepotistic 
favoritism and unfairness (Padgett & Morris, 2005). That being said, admitting 
children of those who graduated or currently work in a university might not recruit 
the most qualified students, but it does strengthen ties between the family and 
the university.  
On an individual level, those who believe in school meritocracy will be 
reluctant to support a nepotistic applicant, and may even refuse when pressured 
to do so. Conversely, those who do not believe in school meritocracy will be 
more accepting of supporting a nepotistic applicant (Wiederkehr, Bonnot, Krauth-
Gruber, & Darnon, 2015). In this study, a scale to measure belief in school 
meritocracy (Wiederkehr et al., 2015) was included to use as a moderator for 
auxiliary analyses.  
On a broader level, people tend to value meritocracy over nepotism 
overall, but value nepotism higher an in-group is involved. Given the differential 
pros and cons of meritocracy and nepotism, it is worth considering when are 
people more or less likely to support merit-based versus nepotistic-based 
applicants? What factors influence people’s support for meritocratic applicants? 
And to what degree might people perceive others' competence differently if they 
discover nepotism is involved?  
Enforced Consensus: Implications for Top-Down Agreement 
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What happens when a group of people feel forced to support an 
applicant? Research on the psychology of forced consensus shows that when 
there is public pressure to agree (i.e. top-down pressure), it works in the short-
term publicly but can create divisiveness privately and ultimately backfire. In 
other words, leaving no room for negotiation works on the surface, but does not 
reflect a genuine consensus (and is often recognized as such by observers). For 
instance, Conway and Schaller (2005) had participants imagine they were in an 
important committee tasked with making a decision for a company. Notably, 
there was either pressure by the president to agree or there was not. Results 
show that when participants believed the whole committee was pressured to 
agree, this pressure for agreement backfired and they were less likely to support 
the President’s decision. Participants who were not pressured, however, were 
more likely to agree with the President. In another study (Conway et al., 2009), 
participants were asked to write about a fraternity, but a member of the fraternity 
was either present or absent. Because participants were pressured to 
communicate positively about the fraternity when the member was present (as 
opposed to absent), participants publicly praised the fraternity in that context but 
spoke negatively about the fraternity in a different context. These two studies 
suggest that public pressure for agreement, which was intended to create a 
consensus, can ironically backfire and cause deviance instead. In the short-term, 
pressure for agreement can create artificial consensus; but in the long-term, it 
tends to backfire.  
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Why does forced consensus backfire? Mediation analyses suggest that 
the backfiring occurs due to both reactance (emotional component) and 
informational contamination (cognitive component; see Conway & Schaller, 2005; 
Conway et al., 2009; Conway et al., 2017; Conway & Repke, 2019). When 
people’s freedom is threatened or removed, reactance occurs and people are 
motivated to restore their freedom by acting against the perceived pressure 
(Silvia, 2006). Examples of reactance include controlling parenting (e.g., the use 
of coercion and punishment), which backfires as it often causes children to want 
more autonomy. Similarly, movie ratings that limit adolescents from viewing adult 
movies backfire, as those movie ratings attract adolescents to these movies 
because of reactance (Varava & Quick, 2015). Thus, in line with prior research 
on forced consensus, when participants were forced to agree with the President 
or to speak highly of the fraternity, part of the backfiring occurs because they 
want to do the opposite to reassert their freedom (Conway & Schaller, 2005; 
Conway et al., 2009).  
Apart from reactance, informational contamination also explains why 
forced consensus backfires (Conway & Schaller, 2005; Conway et al., 2009; 
Conway et al., 2017; Conway & Repke, 2019). The context behind how 
information is communicated influences how we evaluate the veracity of other’s 
opinions (Newtson & Czerlinsky, 1974), such that the information presented is 
discounted if the audience perceives the information as inauthentic, believe the 
consensus is artificially created, or that the consensus is reflective of some 
political agenda (Conway et al., 2017). As an example, consumers of science 
MERITOCRACY VS. NEPOTISM 
 
11 
may find research conducted by liberals specious if it seems reflective of some 
leftist agenda (see Chan et al., 2018). For example, conservatives tend to ignore 
or downplay research that suggests that disruptive patterns of climate change 
are due to human activity (see Campbell & Kay, 2014) and awareness of top-
down pressures can cause people on both sides of the political spectrum to 
oppose ecologically-friendly policies they might otherwise have supported 
(Conway & Repke, 2019). In contrast, liberals may deny psychology research 
findings that go against their core values (e.g. egalitarianism, social justice) if 
they think the scientific findings (e.g. findings from evolutionary psychology) can 
be used for political agendas against their interests (Chan et al., 2018). It may be 
for these reasons that, at a large level, data reveals that governmental 
autocracies interfere with the connection between cultural variables such as 
collectivism and the laws that govern society (Chan & Conway, 2018). 
Taken together, both reactance and informational contamination help 
explain the irony in perceived pressures; metaphorically bludgeoning people with 
psychological force often works in the short term but fails in the long term. 
Because of this, pressure to agree should be used cautiously because of the 
potentially backfiring and divisive effects. One way to think of pressure is like a 
potent drug that successfully eradicates a disease but brings about aversive 
long-term side effects. 
This has two related consequences directly related to applicants for a 
university. (1) Pressure to support an applicant by powerful sources may cause 
short-term public agreement, but this consensus crumbles in the long-term 
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because it creates private disagreement. (2) Nepotistic applicants in general may 
cause a feeling of forced consensus, which might make them especially prone to 
backfiring effects.   
Forced Consensus and Support for College Applicants: Eliciting Reactance 
and Informational Contamination  
Specifically how might the psychology of forced consensus affect support 
for nepotistic versus meritocratic applicants? While reactance and informational 
contamination are both elicited through forced consensus and they often predict 
similar backfiring effects, the two components differ quite significantly as well 
(see Chan & Conway, under review; Conway et al., 2017).  
Informational Contamination 
Informational contamination occurs when an emerging or existing 
consensus is perceived to be artificial or fake. As such, informational 
contamination will likely be elicited when the consensus seems to be constructed 
by any top-down pressure (such as an authority figure’s command) instead of 
reflecting the genuine beliefs of the persons comprising the consensus. All else 
being equal, perceiving that a consensus exists (e.g., the consensus for a 
committee to admit an applicant) will make other people believe that consensus 
is good or right (e.g., Conway et al., 2005; Conway et al., 2009; Conway et al., 
2017; Conway & Repke, 2019).  Informational contamination is the process by 
which that belief in the “goodness” of the consensus is eroded. Since 
informational contamination only occurs when group consensus is present (and 
does not operate for private communications directed only at an individual), 
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participants may publicly support an applicant when pressured to, but that same 
pressure may cause them to privately perceive the applicant as incompetent 
because they discount the emerging consensus as artificial. 
While many are under the impression that students who attend a top 
school are admitted through stellar qualifications, students who are admitted via 
personal connections are often thought to be unfit because the image of 
meritocracy is contaminated: people will discount any consensus related to 
meritocracy when nepotism is also involved, as evidenced by the college 
admissions bribery scandal. Indeed, it is likely for this reason that students 
admitted via legacy programs may avoid divulging how they got the position 
(Harris, 2012).  Thus, awareness that an applicant was admitted due to nepotism 
may create informational contamination of any emergent consensus.  And this 
may be especially so if an authority figure in a university (e.g. President, provost, 
dean, department chair) wants to recruit his or her child into the same university 
and specifically orders people to accept that student. Pointing out the nepotistic 
connection may privately backfire (even if it causes public compliance) because 
the admissions staff may think the admissions “consensus” only reflects the 
nepotistic order and not the child’s competence.  
Reactance 
While both reactance and informational contamination can operate on a 
group level, reactance can occur regardless of what the group believes in. 
Individuals should experience reactance when they are forced to support any 
applicant, regardless if the applicant is meritocratic or nepotistic. When people 
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are forced to support any applicant, they may – even if they still publicly support 
the applicant – privately refuse to reassert their freedom. As such, pressure to 
publicly support any applicant should elicit reactance, which in turn decreases 
private endorsement of that applicant.  
Informational Contamination Versus Reactance in Admissions 
Given these differences between reactance and informational 
contamination, pressure to support any applicant should elicit reactance 
regardless of what the group believes in because one’s choice to support (or not 
support) the applicant is taken away. By extension, no pressure to agree would 
likely result in no reactance. As such, nepotism by itself does not elicit reactance 
when there is no pressure to support that applicant. 
Like reactance, informational contamination will also be affected by 
pressure.  However, unlike reactance, informational contamination should be 
elicited when the group supports a nepotistic applicant (as opposed to supporting 
a meritocratic applicant). Nepotistic applicants elicit informational contamination, 
which in turn drives down public and private support for the applicant when there 
is no pressure. This is because individual admission counselors presumably want 
to recruit the most qualified applicants, so seeing the group support an applicant 
that is not the most qualified contaminates this goal. This contamination is 
exacerbated if there is explicit pressure to support a nepotistic applicant. When 
there is pressure, people would publicly support the nepotistic applicant, but 
privately resent doing so.  
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When there is top-down pressure to support a nepotistic applicant, the 
consensus will likely be perceived as inauthentic and elicit informational 
contamination on a group level. This top-down pressure also elicits reactance on 
an individual level as one’s freedom to support the applicant is removed. 
Consequently, both informational contamination and reactance would push 
participants to publicly endorse the nepotistic applicant because of the pressure 
to agree, but privately not support the applicant.  
The Current Research 
Previous research has found that a third party (i.e. someone who does not 
know the applicant) would likely to support meritocracy over nepotism as the 
default method of recruitment. However, no research has, to my knowledge, 
examined how forced consensus affects the perception of meritocratic and 
nepotistic applicants. Specifically, no research has experimentally tested if 
explicit pressure to support a nepotistic applicant may backfire. This study aims 
to fill that gap by examining the potential irony where people want to recruit their 
family or friends, but pressuring others to do so may backfire. Thus, it may be 
wise for those who want to recruit a family member to withhold pressure.  
In the present study, we examine how participants – taking the role as an 
admissions counselor on an admissions committee that decides which students 
to admit to an elite university in the U.S. – perceive four types of applicants: 
meritocratic, nepotistic, both meritocratic and nepotistic, and neither meritocratic 
or nepotistic. Each participant will be randomly assigned to one of four types of 
applicants. Further, we manipulate whether participants are pressured to support 
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the applicant, and measure if this pressure backfires via reactance and 
informational contamination.  
Hypotheses 
Since I expect a different pattern of results for public and private 
endorsement measures, I discuss hypotheses for public and private 
endorsement of the applicant separately. 
Hypotheses Related to Public Endorsement. 
H1: There will be a main effect of pressure to support the President’s 
favorite applicant, such that it increases public endorsement. 
H2: There will be a nepotism x pressure interaction on public 
endorsement, such that nepotism increases public endorsement if there is 
pressure, but shows a weaker effect if there is no pressure. 
Hypotheses Related to Private Endorsement Ratings 
H3: There will be a main effect of pressure to support the President’s 
favorite applicant, such that it decreases private endorsement ratings. 
H3a: Pressure to support an applicant will decrease private endorsement 
(H3) indirectly via reactance for all applicants.  
H3b. Pressure to support an applicant will decrease private endorsement 
ratings (H3) indirectly via information contamination, but only for nepotistic 
applicants. 
H4: There will be a main effect of nepotism on private endorsement 
ratings, such that nepotistic applicant decrease private endorsement ratings. 
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H5: There will be a nepotism x pressure interaction on private 
endorsement ratings, such that nepotistic applicants decrease private 
endorsement ratings, but this drop will be larger when there is pressure. 
Method 
Power Estimation 
 Based on prior research on the use of pressure to create an artificial 
consensus (Conway & Schaller, 2005; Conway et al., 2009; Conway et al., 
2017), we expect moderate effect sizes. Power analyses revealed that an N of 
126 was required for a projected moderate effect size of f2 = .25 and power = .80.  
Participants 
205 U.S. participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We 
opted for Mechanical Turk because of previous validation as a representative 
sample for research relevant to politics (see e.g., Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 
2015; Conway, Houck, Gornick, & Repke, 2017; Conway & McFarland, in press) 
and because it generally shows similar results as other samples (see, for 
example, Conway et al., 2017; Houck, Conway, & Repke, 2014). We excluded 31 
participants because they did not read the vignettes for at least ten seconds, 
leaving a total of 174 participants.1 Despite this reduced sample, there were 
robust effects. Participants ranged from 18 to 69 years old (M = 38.9, SD  = 
11.8). Gender distribution was fairly evenly split (54.2% male, 45.8% female).  
Independent Variables 
                                                 
1 A timer was attached to all eight vignettes on the Qualtrics survey that is linked to Mechanical Turk, 
which allowed me to see how long each participant read each vignette. Participants did not see this timer.  
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Each participant read a scenario modeled after previous work on 
pressured agreement in other domains (Chan & Conway, under review; Conway 
& Schaller, 2005; Conway et al., 2009; Conway & Repke, 2019). In these 
scenarios, they were asked to imagine themselves as an admissions staff who 
works in an admissions committee at an elite university tasked with choosing 
a ‘Presidential scholar' – one incoming first-year student who will have all tuition 
and expenses waived. The scenarios varied on three variables.  
Pressure to Support Applicant Manipulation. The President of the 
university either tells the admissions committee who his favorite applicant is and 
pressures the committee to support the applicant chosen by the President, or the 
President simply ‘checks in’ on how the committee is doing and tells the 
committee how the Presidential Scholar is chosen is entirely up to the committee. 
In this No Pressure condition, he tells the committee he has no favorite applicant 
and leaves the room. In both conditions, after some deliberation, other members 
of the committee agree on a chosen applicant. 
Meritocratic Manipulation. The applicant is depicted as either being 
highly qualified or relatively average. 
Nepotistic Manipulation. The applicant is depicted as either being the 
child of the President or another typical student. 
All eight versions of the scenarios in this 2 (Pressure) X 2 (Meritocracy) X 
2 (Nepotism) design are listed in Appendix A. All vignettes are approximately 
equal in length and each participant will be randomly assigned to read one 
version. 
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Dependent Measures 
After participants read their assigned vignette, they were asked to 
complete the following measures in this order.  
Public Endorsement. Public endorsement was measured with the 
following item adapted from prior work (Conway et al., 2009; 2017): “In the 
scenario, if I had to publicly voice my opinion of applicant A out loud to everyone 
on the admissions committee, I would publicly endorse this 
applicant.” Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). 
Private Endorsement. Private endorsement was measured with the 
following items adapted from prior work (Conway et al., 2009; 2017). The items 
read “In the scenario, if my opinions about applicant A were kept only to myself, I 
would privately endorse applicant A” and “In the scenario, I privately believe that 
applicant A is highly competent and deserves to be the Presidential scholar – no 
matter what I might say publicly.” Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). This scale demonstrated high reliability, α 
= .87.   
Proposed Mediators 
Informational Contamination. Participants completed a 3-item scale that 
measures their informational contamination in the context of the scenario 
(adapted from Conway & Schaller, 2005; Conway et al., 2009; Conway & Repke, 
2019). Items were “In the scenario, I believe that support for applicant A is part of 
a scheme to help the applicant overcome the strenuous admission process” 
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and “In the scenario, I would distrust support for applicant A because I assume it 
is reflective of some agenda” and “In the scenario, I would distrust admission 
procedures created by the President because I assume it is reflective of some 
agenda.” Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). This scale demonstrated high reliability, α = .84.   
 Reactance. Participants completed a 3-item scale that measures their 
reactance in the context of the scenario (adapted from Conway et al., 2005; 
Conway et al., 2009; Conway et al., 2017). Items were “In the scenario, I felt that 
there was pressure to support applicant A, and that aggravated me” and “In the 
scenario, I felt that there was pressure to support applicant A, which makes me 
want to not support the applicant” and “In the scenario, expressed support for 
applicant A makes me feel as if I should not support applicant A – just to show 
that I have the right to make up my own mind.” Participants responded on a 5-
point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). This scale demonstrated 
high reliability, α = .83.   
Proposed Moderator 
Belief in school meritocracy scale. Participants completed an 8-item 
belief in merit scale (Wiederkehr et al., 2015). Sample items were “At school, 
students who obtain poor grades are those who have not worked enough” and 
“at school, students who obtain good grades are those who have worked hard.” 
Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). This scale demonstrated high reliability, α = .86. The full scale is in 
Appendix B. 
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Perceived Scenario Realism 
Since this is a scenario study, we included two items that asked 
participants how real can they imagine the scenario as a proxy for internal 
validity. Items were “how realistic do you believe the scenario you just read about 
college admissions was?” (1 = not realistic at all, 9 = very realistic) and “In your 
own life, how close do you think the scenarios are to your own real-life 
experiences that you either have had or would be likely to have?” (1 = not close 
at all, 9 = very close). This scale demonstrated adequate reliability, α = .70. 
Results 
Primary Analyses 
Separate 2 (Pressure to agree: yes vs. no) x 2 (Meritocratic: yes vs. no) x 
2 (Nepotistic: yes vs. no) factorial ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect 
of the IVs on our two dependent measures: public endorsement and private 
endorsement.  
In terms of public endorsement, there was a main effect of 
meritocracy, F(1,165) = 43.98, p < .001, ɳp2 = .21. Meritocracy increased public 
endorsement (meritocracy M = 5.35 vs. no meritocracy M = 3.62). There was 
also a main effect of nepotism, F(1,165) = 9.11, p = .003, ɳp2 = .05; descriptive 
results indicated that nepotism decreased public endorsement (nepotistic M = 
4.09 vs. not nepotistic M = 4.85). Inconsistent with H1, there was no main effect 
of pressure, F(1,165) = 1.60, p = .21, ɳp2 = .01 (pressure M = 4.36 vs. no 
pressure M = 4.60). Inconsistent with H2, there was no pressure x nepotism 
interaction, F(1,165) = 1.52, p = .22, ɳp2 = 01. No other interactions reached 
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significance. Figure 1 displays the means for public endorsement. 
For private endorsement, there similarly was a main effect of 
meritocracy, F(1, 166) = 110.17, p < .001, ɳp2 = .40. As expected, meritocracy 
increased private endorsement (meritocracy M = 5.28 vs. no meritocracy M = 
2.87). Consistent with H4, there was also a main effect of nepotism, F(1,166) = 
19.28, p < .001, ɳp2 = .10; descriptive results indicated that nepotism decreased 
private endorsement (nepotistic M = 3.56 vs. not nepotistic M = 4.55). 
Inconsistent with H3, there was no main effect of pressure, F(1,166) = 1.50, p = 
.23, ɳp2 = .01 (pressure M = 4.00 vs. no pressure M = 4.12). Inconsistent with 
H5, there was no nepotism x pressure interaction, F(1,166) = .02, p = .903, ɳp2 = 
.00. No other main effects or interactions reached significance. Figure 2 displays 
the means for private endorsement. 
As suggested above, no main effects or interactions occurred for the 
pressure manipulation on both dependent variables. 
Mean Patterns for Mediators 
Although reactance and informational contamination were quite strongly 
correlated (r = .64, p < .001), it was expected that reactance and informational 
contamination would differentially affect meritocratic and nepotistic applicants. As 
such, separate 2 (Pressure to agree: yes vs. no) x 2 (Meritocratic: yes vs. no) x 2 
(Nepotistic: yes vs. no) factorial ANOVAs were conducted with reactance and 
informational contamination as the DVs.  
In line with our predictions, there was a main effect of pressure on 
reactance, F(1, 166) = 28.24, p < .001, ɳp2 = .15, such that increased pressure 
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led to increased reactance. There was main effect of meritocracy, F(1, 166) = 
31.30, p < .001, ɳp2 = .16, such that meritocracy decreased reactance. There 
was a main effect of nepotism, F(1, 166) = 24.17, p < .001, ɳp2 = .13, such that 
nepotism increased reactance. Notably, these main effects were qualified by a 
pressure x meritocracy interaction, F(1, 166) = .5.06, p = .026, ɳp2 = .03, that 
showed although pressure increased reactance, this effect was weaker when the 
applicant was meritocratic. Additionally, there was a weak but significant 
meritocracy x nepotism interaction, F(1, 166) =. 4.20, p = .042, ɳp2 = .03, 
whereby applicants high in meritocracy showed a weak relationship between 
reactance and nepotism, but applicants low in meritocracy showed a strong 
relationship between reactance and nepotism. No other interactions reached 
significance. Figure 3 displays the means for reactance. 
Also consistent with predictions, when informational contamination was 
the DV, there was main effect of meritocracy, F(1, 166) = 40.53, p < .001, ɳp2 = 
.20, such that meritocracy decreased informational contamination. There was 
also a main effect of nepotism, F(1, 166) = 11.28, p = .001, ɳp2 = .06, such that 
nepotism increased informational contamination. No other main effects or 
interactions reached significance. Figure 4 displays the means for informational 
contamination. 
The effect sizes reported are consistent or even larger when compared to 
prior work that examined the psychology of forced consensus. For instance, 
Conway et al. (2017) reported ɳp2 = .16 for reactance, and Conway et al. (2009) 
reported ɳp2 = .02 for informational contamination. 
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Mediational Analyses 
To examine the hypothesized X→M→Y paths where the mediating 
variables are reactance and informational contamination, I followed 
recommended current practices for testing indirect effects. Specifically, I used the 
PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018; model 4) to compute both normal tests of 
indirect effects and bootstrapped confidence intervals (using 5000 samples) for 
each X → Y indirect effect with reactance or informational contamination as the 
mediator variable. In total, twelve separate mediation analyses were conducted 
to examine the effect of the three IVs (X) on the two DVs (Y) via two mediator 
variables (M). Importantly, the lack of direct X → Y relationships do not invalidate 
indirect effects (Darlington & Hayes, 2017). It is possible that pressure did not 
directly influence endorsement, but did elicit reactance that leads to decreased 
endorsement – both publicly and privately.  
H3a was tested by examining indirect effects of pressure on public and 
private endorsement via reactance. As predicted, pressure significantly increased 
reactance, which in turn significantly decreased both public endorsement 
(indirect effect p < .05) and private endorsement (indirect effect p < .05). H3b 
was tested by examining indirect effects of pressure on public and private 
endorsement via informational contamination (additional analyses excluded non-
nepotistic applicants; n = 88). Contrary to predictions, there were no significant 
indirect effects between pressure and public endorsement (p = .50), and 
pressure and private endorsement (p = .49) 
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Additional mediation analyses revealed that reactance partially mediated 
the effect of meritocracy on both public endorsement (indirect effect = .24, p’s < 
.05) and private endorsement (indirect effect = .36, p’s < .05). Likewise, 
reactance partially mediated the effect of nepotism on both public endorsement 
(indirect effect = -.30, p’s < .05) and private endorsement (indirect effect = -.44, 
p’s < .05).  
Similarly, informational contamination partially mediated the effect of 
meritocracy on both public endorsement (indirect effect = .55, p’s < .05) and 
private endorsement (indirect effect = .56, p’s < .05). Informational contamination 
also partially mediated the effect of nepotism on both public endorsement 
(indirect effect = -.36,  p’s < .05) and private endorsement (indirect effect = -.42, 
p’s < .05). Tables 1 and 2 reports all mediation analyses. 
Moderation Analyses 
To analyze whether our effects are stronger for participants high in belief 
in school meritocracy, moderation analyses were conducted. I followed standard 
current practices for testing the moderating effect of a continuous variable on the 
relationship between two other continuous variables via simultaneous regression 
(Hayes, 2018). Specifically, I used the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018; model 1) 
to examine if pressure and outcome variables (public endorsement and private 
endorsement) were altered at different levels of belief in school meritocracy. 
Results revealed null effects, suggesting that our manipulations did not 
differentially impact those high or low in belief in school meritocracy. 
Scenario Realism 
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 Overall, participants rated the scenario to be moderately realistic (M = 
5.51, SD = 1.93). The key patterns and results were essentially identical, both 
descriptively and inferentially, when analyses were conducted on only 
participants who reported above the midpoint on scenario realism (4.5 on a 1-9 
scale; n = 130).      
Discussion 
As a whole, the results provided mixed support of our hypotheses. 
Contrary to predictions, the pressure manipulation did not directly (but did 
indirectly, through reactance) impact public or private endorsement. Below, I 
discuss some of the key interpretational difficulties posed by these data, as well 
as implications for these results. 
Why Public and Private Endorsement Showed Similar Patterns 
 I expected private and public endorsement to show different patterns, but 
this did not occur. Why? Part of the reason might have to do with how pressure 
affected endorsement for the President’s favorite applicant. As a whole (i.e. 
collapsing across different types of applicants), the presence of reactance 
suggests that pressure did affect the participant at an individual level, but the 
relative lack of informational contamination suggests that pressure did not – from 
the participants’ eyes - influence the committee as a whole. As a result, 
participants may be less influenced by pressure because the committee was also 
not influenced the President’s command. Consequently, participants were not 
compelled to display a different behavior under pressure because others seem to 
resist said pressure. Failing to comply with the President’s command did not 
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seem as threatening. This in turn induced participants to endorse the applicants 
– publicly and privately – in a similar pattern. 
Why Pressure Manipulation Showed No Effects: Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory 
Alternatively, the pressure manipulation yielded no direct effects possibly 
because of cognitive dissonance, which refers to an uncomfortable state of mind 
that arises when one’s actions and beliefs are not aligned (Festinger & Carlsmith, 
1959). Past research has found that westerners are motivated to align their 
actions and beliefs because of high individualism and the desire to have a 
consistent self-concept across various contexts (Heine & Lehman, 1997; 
McLeod, 2008). In this case, participants may experience cognitive dissonance 
when the applicant they are forced to support (i.e. action) is not aligned with their 
views on the meritocracy and nepotism (i.e. belief).  
There is good reason to suggest that the participants’ beliefs of 
meritocracy and nepotism were highly ingrained in their western cultural 
worldview. Since meritocracy is a core feature of the American Dream, whereby 
high status reflects hard work and individual merit (McCoy & Major, 2007; Fiske, 
2011), people who value meritocracy associate high status with hard work. 
Therefore, it would be unfair for people to have high status without putting in the 
effort, as reflected in some cases of nepotism.  
Given these perceptions, pressure to support a non-meritocratic applicant 
may fail because of cognitive dissonance (i.e. when actions and beliefs do not 
align). That is, supporting non-meritocratic applicants (action) directly goes 
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against the meritocratic ideal (belief). To align this discrepancy in one’s action 
and belief, participants either alter their actions to align with the belief (i.e. 
support the meritocratic applicant regardless of pressure) or alter their beliefs to 
align with the action (i.e. support the non-meritocratic applicant because of 
pressure and tacitly forgo the meritocratic ideal). Our data suggests that 
participants largely opted for the former option: they supported the meritocratic 
applicant and rejected the non-meritocratic applicant, even when forcefully urged 
to do otherwise. 
 Despite the lack of pressure manipulation working, theoretically 
meaningful indirect effects of X→Y via M can occur even without direct X→Y 
relationships. As predicted, pressure did elicit reactance, the same psychological 
mechanism behind why (as we shall see below) people support meritocracy and 
oppose nepotism. 
Effects of Reactance and Informational Contamination 
 Pressure manipulation aside, meritocracy was associated with low 
reactance and low informational contamination. As predicted, low scores on 
these two variables led to increased endorsement ratings. In contrast, nepotism 
was associated with high reactance and high informational contamination. As 
expected, high scores on these two variables led to decreased endorsement 
ratings. These findings can be explained by the significant indirect effects of 
meritocracy and nepotism on both public and private endorsement. But what do 
these indirect relationships, mediated by reactance and informational 
contamination, suggest on a practical level?  
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The Tension Between Meritocracy and Nepotism 
There are many legitimate benefits of meritocracy (Ledgerwood et al., 
2011). Indeed, meritocracy has been shown to increase motivation and hard 
work and is often rightfully attributed to success and honesty (Dahlström, 
Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012; Egeberg, Gornitzka, & Trondol, 2017). As such, 
people may be less susceptible to reactance when supporting a meritocratic 
applicant since they were presumably going to support that applicant anyway. 
Additionally, participants likely experience little informational contamination when 
supporting a meritocratic applicant because meritocracy provides little, if any, 
cues of some ulterior agenda that discounts the admission committee’s 
consensus. As a result, participants reported high endorsement (both public and 
private) for the meritocratic applicant. 
In contrast, a nepotistic applicant elicits reactance because participants do 
not want to support someone not worthy of being the Presidential scholar. 
Indeed, it is possible that nepotistic applicants elicit implicit pressure because 
there might be negative consequences for not supporting the beneficiary of 
nepotism. This form of implied pressure also elicits reactance, as participants’ 
freedom to support (or not support) the applicant is implicitly removed. 
Participants also experience informational contamination because it does not 
seem fair to support an applicant who has connections but no merit. Thus, it 
comes as no surprise that the committee’s unanimous support for the nepotistic 
applicant led participants to perceive the support to be reflective of some agenda. 
As a result, people reported low endorsement (both public and private) for the 
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nepotistic applicant. 
Taken together, people seem to publicly and privately disfavor nepotistic 
applicants regardless of pressure. As such, people should be aware that 
nepotistic hiring comes with psychological baggage of reactance and 
informational contamination. This could theoretically put many people in a tricky 
spot. People often want to recruit their close ones into their own workplace (e.g. 
organization, teams, or schools) and fully believe that their close ones are a great 
fit for the position, but doing so can backfire if others know about the connection. 
Yet, concealing the connection can also backfire in the long term since it can be 
perceived as hiding a conflict of interest. One way to solve this issue is to have 
recruiters (which may include the authority figure) convince people in the 
organization that the nepotistic applicant was hired not solely due to the 
connection; the recruiting process was the same for everyone including nepotistic 
applicant and the connection was merely a means for getting one’s ‘foot in the 
door’. Another related way is to highlight nepotistic applicants’ merit to offset 
reactance and informational contamination elicited by nepotism.    
Limitations of the Present Work 
Like all studies, certain limitations exist in our study. First, we used 
hypothetical scenarios that asks people to imagine being in an admissions 
committee and how they felt if they are pressured (or not pressured) to support a 
particular type of applicant. Though scenario studies are commonly-used for 
research and have many advantages (e.g., Conway et al., 2005; 2009; Conway 
& Repke, 2019), picturing a scenario is nonetheless different than the reality of 
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that scenario. That being said, this study’s sample as a whole rated the realism 
of the scenario to be above average (i.e. above 4.5 on a 1-9 scale), which 
suggests that they could imagine the scenario relatively well. Secondly, our 
approach to meritocracy and nepotism was rather simple. We opted for a clear-
cut ‘yes vs. no’ paradigm and only offered participants the choice between 
applicant A or applicant B for the purposes of experimental manipulation. In 
reality, an admissions committee may have to narrow down among dozens of 
finalists without a clear indication of which applicant is the most meritocratic, and 
there may also be multiple nepotistic applicants. Thirdly, we cannot confidently 
say that our results would hold across multiple recruitment contexts. This study 
utilized a U.S. sample, so these effects would not necessarily occur in the same 
manner in other countries. Further, group dynamics of every admission 
committee can be highly complex and variations in status and power can 
influence who gets recruited. Finally, the independent variable of ‘pressure’ did 
not work: It had no direct statistically-significant impact on participant public and 
private endorsement. Pressure was captured in the vignette when the authority 
figure “forcefully urges the committee to support his chosen applicant” and can 
be interpreted as too abstract (i.e. no concrete threats or consequences were laid 
out), such that participants were not compelled to publicly endorse the 
President’s favorite applicant. Alternatively, it is plausible that pressure did not 
make a difference because of the engrained perceptions of meritocratic and 
nepotistic applicants. 
Future Directions 
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 This study revealed tensions between meritocratic and nepotistic 
recruitment methods. But there are other approaches to recruitment. Namely, 
universities (or other entities that recruit) may recruit to increase 
underrepresented groups (i.e. affirmative action, diversity programs), recruit 
people with certain skillsets not commonly associated with meritocracy (e.g. 
student athletes), or even intentionally recruit those with minimal qualifications 
and experience (e.g. summer internships). These recruitment methods each 
have their own benefits and drawbacks, so future research could shed light on 
the tensions between these recruitment methods. It is likely that reactance and 
informational contamination will be elicited, but these psychological mechanisms 
should theoretically operate differently within each recruitment method.  
 Additionally, future research could examine what occurs when there is 
pressure to oppose a specific type of applicant. For instance, pressure (from an 
authority figure) to oppose a meritocratic applicant may, unlike pressure to 
support, elicit both reactance and informational contamination, since the 
participant would like to support the meritocratic applicant and seeing the 
committee oppose the most qualified applicant may be reflective of some 
agenda. In contrast, pressure to oppose a nepotistic applicant may, unlike the 
current study, yield little reactance or informational contamination.   
Concluding Remarks 
Although the present results do not draw a direct relationship between 
pressure and endorsement, pressure indirectly elicits reactance, the same 
mechanism that is partly responsible for why people tend to favor meritocratic 
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applicants but disfavor nepotistic applicants. There may be good reason for 
nepotistic recruitment, but it comes with the psychological baggage of reactance 
and informational contamination.  
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Table 1 
The impact of reactance: Simple and indirect effects of pressure, meritocracy, and 
nepotism on public endorsement and private endorsement 
________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                  Indirect Effect Via Reactance     
                 _______________________________________________ 
                                 Simple          Indirect       Indirect     Indirect 
                      Effect          Effect            Lower CI       Upper CI         
________________________________________________________________________  
 
Pressure/Public Endorse   .14      -.37*  .16 .70 
Pressure/Private Endorse   .43 -.55*  .27 .91 
Meritocracy on public endorsement 1.48*   .24*  -.54 -.05 
Meritocracy on private endorsement 2.06* .36*  -.64 -.17 
Nepotism on public endorsement  -.46* -.30*  .11 .61 
Nepotism private endorsement  -.55* -.44*  .20 .77 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: N = 174  *p < .05; Confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrapped samples. 
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Table 2 
The impact of informational contamination: Simple and indirect effects of pressure, 
meritocracy, and nepotism on public endorsement and private endorsement 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                             Indirect Effect Via Information Contamination                     
_______________________________________________________________________ 
                                    Simple         Indirect         Indirect       Indirect 
                       Effect           Effect            Lower CI       Upper CI         
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pressure/Public Endorse (whole)  -.23 -.17   -.08 -.46 
Pressure/Private Endorse (whole)  -.13 -.20   -.10 -.54 
Pressure/Public Endorse (half)^  -.53 -.15   -.67 -.50 
Pressure/Private Endorse (half)^  -.09 -.17   -.69 -.49 
Meritocracy on public endorsement .1.18*   .55*  -.95 -.25 
Meritocracy on private endorsement     1.86* .56*  -.93 -.28 
Nepotism on public endorsement  -.40* -.36*  .11 .72 
Nepotism on private endorsement     -.58* -.42*  .14 .76 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: N = 174, ^n = 88 (analyses excluded non-nepotistic applicants)  *p < .05; 
Confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrapped samples.   
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Figure 1. Effect of Pressure, Meritocracy, and Nepotism on Public Endorsement. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 2. Effect of Pressure, Meritocracy, and Nepotism on Private Endorsement. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 3. Effect of Pressure, Meritocracy, and Nepotism on Reactance.  
Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 4. Effect of Pressure, Meritocracy, and Nepotism on Informational 
Contamination. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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Appendix A:  
All Eight Vignettes 
Each participant only sees 1 vignette. There are a total of 8 vignettes. 
IV1: Pressure to Support (yes vs. no) 
IV2: Meritocratic Applicant (yes vs. no) 
IV3: Nepotistic Applicant (yes vs. no) 
All vignettes have the common opening, but different endings. 
Common Opening 
Imagine that you are working in an elite university and you are a member of a 
committee responsible for admitting incoming first-year students. This 
committee includes the President of the university and ten other people from 
various departments. One day, you and your committee are working with the 
university President to decide who should be the next Presidential Scholar, 
awarded to one phenomenal incoming first-year student who will have all 
tuition and expenses waived. 
Ending: Yes Pressure / Yes Meritocratic/ Yes Nepotistic 
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A 
and Applicant B.  At the key meeting, the President tells the entire committee that he 
favors applicant A and forcefully urges the committee to support his chosen applicant. 
When the final vote occurs, every single person on the committee -- all ten members -- 
unanimously agree that applicant A should get the award. Upon additional inspection of 
applicant A, you realize that applicant A is highly qualified in many respects, and that 
applicant A is the child of the President. In contrast, applicant B is quite average in many 
respects. It is now time to decide who should be the next Presidential Scholar. 
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Ending: Yes Pressure / Yes Meritocratic / No Nepotistic 
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A 
and Applicant B.  At the key meeting, the President tells the entire committee that he 
favors applicant A and forcefully urges the committee to support his chosen applicant. 
When the final vote occurs, every single person on the committee -- all ten members -- 
unanimously agree that applicant A should get the award. Upon additional inspection of 
applicant A, you realize that the applicant is highly qualified in many respects, and that 
applicant A has no previous ties to anyone in the university. In contrast, applicant B is 
quite average in many respects. It is now time to decide who should be the next 
Presidential Scholar. 
Ending: Yes Pressure / No Meritocratic / Yes Nepotistic 
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A 
and Applicant B.  At the key meeting, the President tells the entire committee that he 
favors applicant A and forcefully urges the committee to support his chosen applicant. 
When the final vote occurs, every single person on the committee -- all ten members -- 
unanimously agree that applicant A should get the award. Upon additional inspection of 
applicant A, you realize that applicant A is quite average in many respects, and that this 
applicant is the child of the President. In contrast, applicant B is highly qualified in many 
respects. It is now time to decide who should be the next Presidential Scholar. 
Ending: Yes Pressure / No Meritocratic / No Nepotistic  
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A 
and Applicant B.  At the key meeting, the President tells the entire committee that he 
favors applicant A and forcefully urges the committee to support his chosen applicant. 
When the final vote occurs, every single person on the committee -- all ten members -- 
unanimously agree that applicant A should get the award. Upon additional inspection of 
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applicant A, you realize that applicant A is quite average in many respects, and that 
applicant A has no previous ties with anyone in the university. In contrast, applicant B is 
highly qualified in many respects. It is now time to decide who should be the next 
Presidential Scholar. 
Ending: No Pressure / Yes Meritocratic/ Yes Nepotistic 
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A 
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President makes it clear that everyone in the 
committee has an equal say in choosing the Presidential Scholar. He tells the committee 
that he has no favorite applicant, and emphasizes that to ensure that everyone can voice 
their true opinions, the final vote will be anonymous so the end results could not be 
traced back to individual responses. When the final vote occurs, every single person on 
the committee -- all ten members -- unanimously agree that applicant A should get the 
award. Upon additional inspection of this chosen applicant, you realize that applicant A 
is highly qualified in many respects, and that applicant A is the child of the President. In 
contrast, applicant B is quite average in many respects. It is now time to decide who 
should be the next Presidential Scholar. 
Ending: No Pressure / Yes Meritocratic / No Nepotistic 
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A 
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President makes it clear that everyone in the 
committee has an equal say in choosing the Presidential Scholar. He tells the committee 
that he has no favorite applicant, and emphasizes that to ensure that everyone can voice 
their true opinion, the final vote will be anonymous so the end results could not be traced 
back to individual responses. When the final vote occurs, every single person on the 
committee -- all ten members -- unanimously agree that applicant A should get the 
award. Upon additional inspection of this chosen applicant, you realize that applicant A 
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is highly qualified in many respects, and that applicant A has no previous ties with 
anyone in the university. In contrast, applicant B is quite average in many respects. It is 
now time to decide who should be the next Presidential Scholar. 
Ending: No Pressure / No Meritocratic / Yes Nepotistic 
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A 
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President makes it clear that everyone in the 
committee has an equal say in choosing the Presidential Scholar. He tells the committee 
that he has no favorite applicant, and emphasizes that to ensure that everyone can voice 
their true opinions, the final vote will be anonymous so the end results could not be 
traced back to individual responses. When the final vote occurs, every single person on 
the committee -- all ten members -- unanimously agree that applicant A should get the 
award. Upon additional inspection of this chosen applicant, you realize that applicant A 
is quite average in many respects, and that applicant A is the child of the President. In 
contrast, applicant B is highly qualified in many respects. It is now time to decide who 
should be the next Presidential Scholar. 
Ending: No Pressure / No Meritocratic / No Nepotistic  
Administration has narrowed down the committee’s choices to two finalists: Applicant A 
and Applicant B. At the key meeting, the President makes it clear that everyone in the 
committee has an equal say in choosing the Presidential Scholar. He tells the committee 
that he has no favorite applicant, and emphasizes that to ensure that everyone can voice 
their true opinions, the final vote will be anonymous so the end results could not be 
traced back to individual responses. When the final vote occurs, every single person on 
the committee -- all ten members -- unanimously agree that applicant A should get the 
award. Upon additional inspection of this chosen applicant, you realize that applicant A 
is quite average in many respects, and that applicant A has no previous ties with anyone 
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in the university. In contrast, applicant B is highly qualified in many respects. It is now 
time to decide who should be the next Presidential Scholar. 
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Appendix B:  
Belief in School Meritocracy Scale (Wiederkehr et al., 2015). 
Participants respond on a 5-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree. 
1. At school, when there is a will, there is a way. 
2. Everyone has the same chances to succeed at school. 
3. To succeed at school, one only has to work hard. 
4. At school, students who obtain poor grades are those who have 
not worked enough. 
5. At school, students are rewarded (they obtain good grades, 
praise) for their efforts. 
6. At school, children obtain the grades they deserve. 
7. At school, students who obtain good grades are those who 
have worked hard. 
8. *Willingness is not always enough to succeed at school. 
(*Reverse-scored). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
